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I. INTRODUCTION
Consolidation of disputes arising out of the same law and facts
poses numerous problems in private arbitration disputes. The power to
consolidate is vested in courts pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.1 The courts, however, are confronted with special
problems when consolidation involves private arbitration disputes because
of the contractual nature of arbitration agreements and because the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) is silent on the issue of consolidation?
The FAA's silence has led to a great deal of controversy both between and
within federal circuit courts over whether a court has the power to order
consolidated arbitrations.3
One of the major issues that has been debated by both courts and
commentators is whether a court has the power to look beyond arbitration
agreements in ordering consolidation of arbitrations. Consolidation
proponents point to the various policy and statutory considerations within
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Arbitration Act,
which make mandatory consolidation outside the contract seem both logical
and legally supportable.4  Consolidation opponents cite recent United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the FAA that favor strict
enforcement of arbitration agreements rather than policy considerations,
such as judicial economy,' The- recent trend in federal circuit courts has
been to oppose consolidation, a position likely to continue absent Supreme
Court direction to the contrary.
This Comment will examine United States Supreme Court
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) states:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court. ... [the court] may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated under a consolidated complaint; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.
2. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & 1991 Supp.).
3. See generally Consolidation by Federal Court of Arbilration Proceedings Brought
Under FederalArbitration Act, 104 A.L.R. Fed. 251 (1991); Karen M. Chastain, Note,
Federal Circuit Conflict Regarding Consolidation ofArbitration, 40 U. FLA. L, REV. 411
(1988).
4. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text. See generally S. Douglas Kerner,
Note, Federal Courts Lack the Power to Consolidate Arbitration Proceedings, Baesler v.
Continental Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990), 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 349 (1991).
5. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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decisions discussing relationships between courts and private agreements to
arbitrate that are applicable to consolidation. This Comment will also
scrutinize the reasoning behind the federal circuit decisions that oppose
and support consolidation. The case law analysis will be followed by a
review of the responses some states have made when attempting to resolve
consolidation with legislative action. Finally, this Comment will suggest
some possible answers to the consolidation problem that has been plaguing
courts for almost two decades.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSOLIDATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:
ENFORCING CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
Arbitration agreements have become increasingly common in
modem business contracts. While initially hostile to arbitration, the
judiciary has recently embraced arbitration as a solution to an
overburdened judicial system. The United States Supreme Court has also
become more receptive to contractual arbitration agreements.6  This
section will explore some of the relevant sections of the Federal
Arbitration Act, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the role courts
should play in enforcing arbitration agreements.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act Generally
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925. The
FAA validated arbitration contracts and overturned many common law
doctrines hostile to arbitration.7 In passing the FAA, Congress sought to
provide alternatives to litigation by making agreements to arbitrate legally
enforceable.' Congress also expressed an interest in avoiding the delay
6. For analysis of recent developments on the United States Supreme Court's attitude
towards arbitration see Arthur S. Feldman, Note, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University: Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy
Under the FAA, 69 TEx. L. REV. 691 (1991).
7. See generally Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The
Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).
8. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1924); The House Report stated "[tlhis bill declares simply that such agreements for
arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their
enforcement." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess, 1, 2 (1924).
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and expense of litigation through the use of arbitration? These purposes
can conflict when a court is attempting to interpret an ambiguous
arbitration agreement. Strictly enforcing arbitration agreements sometimes
produces inefficient results that parties may be seeking to avoid when they
contract for resolution of disputes through arbitration. Moreover, while the
FAA requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements, the FAA does
not specify which considerations a court should use when determining the
proper method of enforcement. Courts considering consolidated
arbitrations (consolidation is not mentioned in the FAA) have favored
different interpretations of whether consolidation outside the contract is
within the power of courts under the FAA.
Section 4 of the FAA provides that once a court is satisfied that a
contract requires arbitration, the court must order the parties "to proceed
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 0 Those
opposing consolidation believe the dominant concern of Congress in
passing the FAA was to enforce private arbitration agreements as
written.1" Those favoring consolidation assert that doubts about the reach
of the FAA should be resolved in favor of consolidated arbitrations.'
Active debate on each view has occupied both courts and commentators
for many years. However, some recent United States Supreme Court
decisions have helped clarify the Court's view on the FAA.
B. The United States Supreme Court's Response to Arbitration Agreements
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.," the Supreme Court explained that the FAA "is a congressional
9. "[I]t is practically appropriate that [legislation be approved] when there is no such
agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely
eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and
enforceable." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 2 (1924).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988 & Supp. 1991) provides:
[A] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court ... for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement....
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
11. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
13. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.""
The Court added that "the Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of consolidation."' In recent years the Court has
adopted a broader view of the enforceability of arbitration agreements. In
Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,16 the Court
overruled a 1953 decision, Wilko v. Swan, that had limited the arbitrability
of certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933.17 The Rodriguez
Court held that an agreement to arbitrate statutory securities claims was
valid under the broad language of the FAA. The Court characterized the
Wilko decision as evidence of the old judicial hostility towards
arbitration."1
As courts have become increasingly receptive to arbitration
agreements in almost all circumstances, the Supreme Court has also been
faced with the problem of determining how these agreements should be
enforced. The Court has stated that "the purpose of Congress in 1925 was
to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not
more so." 19  Enforcing arbitration agreements as "bargained-for"
contracts has gained momentum in the Supreme Court." In Moses H.
Cone, the Court ordered the enforcement of an arbitration agreement even
though the arbitration would result in inefficient bifurcated proceedings.'
The Moses H. Cone decision opened the door for the Supreme Court's
decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,' which firmly
established agreements to arbitrate as almost exclusively contractual in
nature.
C. The Byrd Decision: Consolidation and the Contract
Almost all post-1985 federal circuit court decisions on
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 24-25.
16. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
17. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
18. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 480-82.
19. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
20. See Volt Info. Sei., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468 (1989) (parties may contract to use different arbitration rules other than those set
forth in the FAA); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (parties may contract to arbitrate statutory claims). See generally Feldman, supra
note 6.
21. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 20.
22. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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consolidated arbitration mention the Supreme Court's decision in Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. However, the Byrd decision did not
provide a direct holding on the issue of consolidation. Byrd involved a
written agreement to arbitrate claims that arose out of a broker-dealer
relationship. Byrd had filed an action against Dean Witter Reynolds in
federal district court alleging various securities and state law violations.
Dean Witter filed a motion to compel arbitration of the pendant state
claims pursuant to the arbitration agreement. Both the district court and
the court of appeals refused to compel the arbitration of state law claims.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FAA requires district courts
to compel arbitration of pendant arbitrable claims, even when the result
could be the inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different
fora.' The Court added that there was no room for discretion in the
district court and that the FAA mandated all courts to enforce arbitration
agreements as signed.' This enforcement requirement, the Court
explained, was in furtherance of the FAA's legislative purpose of ensuring
judicial enforcement of privately made arbitration agreements whether or
not it promoted the expeditious resolution of claims.'
Circuit courts have applied the reasoning of Byrd to the
consolidation question in arbitration cases. Opponents of consolidation use
Byrd to reject court ordered consolidation on the grounds that courts would
have to go outside the contract to apply consolidation. This "modified
contract" may usurp the Court's reasoning in Byrd that the FAA mandates
the enforcement of arbitration agreements as written. 6 However, courts
that have chosen to consolidate arbitrations assert that Byrd gives no
holding on consolidation, and while judicial economy may not be the main
goal of the FAA, it remains a desired effect and should be pursued when
consolidation would not conflict with the terms of the original
agreement." Whether the former or latter application of Byrd in
consolidated arbitration cases is correct has not been determined by the
Supreme Court. Analyzing the decisions of federal circuit courts both pre-
and post-Byrd helps clarify the arguments opposed to and in favor of court
ordered consolidation.
23. Id. at 217. For a discussion of some of the broad ramifications of the Byrd decision
see Michael Durrer, Note, Enforcing Arbitration of Federal Securities Law Claims: The
Effect of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335 (1987).
24. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218.
25. Id. at 220-21.
26. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
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III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
No consensus of opinion exists as to whether it is permissible for
courts to order consolidation of arbitrations under the FAA. The trend
since the Supreme Court's decision in Byrd has been against court ordered
consolidation. However, even the Byrd decision did not definitively
resolve the debate. This section of the paper will examine the reasoning
behind the federal circuit courts' decisions that have rejected or accepted
consolidation.
A. Strict Interpretation of Contracts:
Courts Lack the Discretion to Order Consolidation
In American Centennial Ins. Co. v. National Casualty
Company,28 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals joined a growing majority
of federal circuits that have refused to order mandatory consolidation of
arbitration proceedings. American Centennial involved a dispute over eight
separate reinsurance treaties which contained clauses providing that
disputes arising under the treaties would be submitted to arbitration. The
plaintiffs demanded arbitration on all eight treaties and sought to
consolidate the arbitration proceedings into a single action. The treaties did
not contain express or implied terms either allowing or requiring
consolidation.'
The Sixth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Dean
Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, upheld the district court's decision not to
consolidate the arbitrations. The Sixth Circuit stated that courts are not
permitted to interfere with private arbitration agreements even when the
result may be the inefficient maintenance of separate arbitration
proceedings. Because the contracts in this case were silent on the issue of
consolidation, the court refused to order consolidation?
The Sixth Circuit's decision follows the Eighth Circuit's 1990
decision in Baesler v. Continental Grain Co.,31 which also rejected
consolidation. In Baesler, like American Centennial, the court rejected
consolidation on the grounds that the FAA requires courts to enforce
28. 951 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1991).
29. Id.
30. Id. This Sixth Circuit case upheld the decision of the district court (American
Centennial Ins. Co. v. National Casualty Co., 761 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1991)) and
resolved a split in the circuit over whether mandatory consolidation was appropriate. See
Hoover Group, Inc. v. Probala & Assoc., 710 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (court
ordered consolidation is permissible under limited situations).
31. 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990).
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arbitration agreements as written, and a court cannot go outside the
agreement to mandate consolidation. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have also held that district courts lack the power to order
consolidation where the arbitration agreements do not specifically provide
for consolidation. These courts have adopted the view that a court may
only enforce an arbitration agreement "in accordance with its terms. " '
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas
Shipping Co.,' compared an arbitration clause with a forum selection
clause that would determine both the place where disputes would be settled
and the procedures used to resolve the differences. If an agreement did not
provide for consolidation it was not a procedure to which the parties
consented. Deviations from these arbitration agreements could be treated
as a breach of contract. '
The federal circuit courts that have refused to compel
consolidation have declined to do so almost exclusively based upon a
theory that the courts' only role in the arbitration process is to strictly
enforce arbitration agreements. These courts view attempts to consolidate
beyond the scope of the contract as a modification of the original
arbitration agreement. If courts are to follow the Supreme Court's mandate
in Byrd and enforce arbitration agreements as written, they clearly could
not read provisions into a contract which would modify the original
agreement. However, some courts have rejected the theory that
consolidation represents an alteration of an arbitration agreement. These
"consolidation advocates" continue to look beyond the contract for policy
and efficiency considerations that support consolidation.
B. Looking Outside the Contract: The Power to Order Consolidation
Courts ordering consolidation emphasize that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP), specifically Rules 42(a) and 81(a)(3), provide
legal support for consolidation.' Rule 81(a)(3) allows courts to apply
32. Protective Life Ins. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins., 873 F.2d 281 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(agreements between three parties did not provide for consolidation, and federal courts were
without power to consolidate absent such provisions); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson
Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987) (the sole question for a district court to determine
is whether an agreement provides for consolidated arbitration); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western
Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
33. 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984).
34. Id.
35. See Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966, 975
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (J.A. 1976); Robinson v. Warner, 370 F. Supp.
828, 831 (D.R.I. 1974). See generally Chastain, supra note 3, at 420.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the FAA is silent on matters
of procedure. 6  Because the FAA is silent on consolidation, courts
should apply FRCP 42, allowing consolidation of actions involving
common questions of law and fact.37  Whether these provisions of the
Federal Rules provide an adequate ground for consolidation is clearly
debatable. The circuit court decisions allowing consolidation help shed
light on this debate.
In the leading case allowing for consolidation, Compania
Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping,' the Second Circuit
held that the district court had the power to consolidate two arbitrations
"because the extensive and complicated issues were so intertwined and
overlapping that it could have caused great and irreparable injustice" if the
arbitrations proceeded separately. 9 The Nereus court also stated that the
"liberal purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act clearly require that this
Act be interpreted so as to permit and even to encourage the consolidation
of arbitration proceedings in proper cases."' However, following the
Supreme Court's decision in Byrd, there was some question about whether
Nereus was still good law in the Second Circuit.
In Ore and Chemical Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc.,4 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York refused
to consolidate arbitrations where the original agreements had not provided
for consolidation. The court rejected Nereus, reasoning that the Second
Circuit would have to overrule Nereus in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Byrd. The Ore court read Byrd as mandating that courts
enforce arbitration agreements strictly, which prevented the court from
going outside the contract to order consolidation.' The district court
also concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, used as
justification for consolidation in Nereus, could not be used to alter the
original arbitration agreement.' Finally, the Ore court asserted that
arbitrators deciding the merits of the matter could more efficiently rule on
procedural matters like consolidation. Subsequent cases in the Second
Circuit have not followed Ore.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) provides that "[in proceedings underTitle 9, U.s.C.,
relating to arbitration, ... these rules apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are
not provided for in those statues."
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). See supra note 1.
38. 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 968.
40. Id. at 975.
41. 606 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
42. Id. at 1513.
43. Id. at 1513-15.
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In Sociedad Anonima de Navegacion Petrolera v. CiA. De
Petroleos de Chile S.A.,' a district court in the Second Circuit decided
that the Byrd decision did not bar mandatory consolidation. The court
found that the reliance on Byrd by the Ore court was misguided because
Byrd did not specifically address the consolidation issue. The Sociedad
court, following the rationale in Nereus, reasoned that courts could order
consolidation to promote judicial economy where there was no direct
conflict with the arbitration agreement. Consolidating arbitrations, if not
specifically prohibited, was within the discretion of a district court. 4'
The District Court for the Southern District of New York once
again addressed the issue of the applicability of Nereus in light of Ore in
Elmarina, Inc. v. Comexas, N.V.6 In Elmarina, the district court was
presented with a situation where consolidating arbitrations would avoid
both the possibility of inconsistent results and save money for all parties
involved. The Elmarina court stated that "[a]lthough the decisions of the
Ninth Circuit in Weyerhauser and Judge Edelstein in Ore are compelling,
the Court is inclined to . . . abide by the Second Circuit's opinion in
Nereus.""7  Furthermore, the court asserted that while the Supreme
Court's decision in Byrd was instructive, it did not reverse Nereus. The
Elmarina court listed several factors that could be considered by courts in
deciding whether to consolidate arbitrations:
1) The possibility of conflicting findings;
2) The possibility that a substantial right might be prejudiced if
separate arbitration proceedings are conducted;
3) The possibility of conflicting awards or inconsistent results
where common questions of law or fact exist; and
4) The possibility that undue prejudice, delay or cost may be
avoided.
These factors are to be considered by the district court in exercising its
discretionary consolidation powers.'
44. 634 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
45. Id. at 809.
46. 679 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
47. Id. at 391.
48. Id. The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio applied these factors in
Hoover Group, Inc. v. Probala & Associates, 710 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1989), and
decided that consolidation was appropriate.
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Whether or not a district court has the discretionary power to
consolidate is a central issue of debate since the Supreme Court's decision
in Byrd. Although other circuits have unequivocally applied Byrd to
consolidation cases, Second Circuit courts have refused to do so in most
cases. The Second Circuit has yet to resolve the post-Byrd consolidation
issue but the majority of cases in the circuit continue to follow Nereus,
endorsing consolidation.
4
The debate over consolidation is likely to continue absent a
Supreme Court decision or a specific legislative directive. Some states
have attempted to solve the problem by passing state arbitration acts
allowing court ordered consolidation. However, these legislative efforts in
states have met with some resistance from those who feel the state
legislatures are usurping the Federal Arbitration Act.50
IV. THE STATE'S RESPONSE: LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES
To CONSOLIDATION
State legislatures have been slow to offer any solutions to the
consolidation problem. States that have attempted to provide for
consolidated arbitrations have been careful not to preempt the FAA.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court has
yet to strike down a state consolidation statute for being in conflict with
the FAA. This may suggest that those states desiring to allow consolidated
arbitrations should pass the appropriate legislation in their state legislatures
or be left with the often unclear decision of the federal courts. This section
will explore state statutes that have been passed as a response to
consolidated arbitration.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in New England
Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co.,' that consolidated arbitrations
could be ordered under the Massachusetts' arbitration consolidation statute.
The appellants sought to consolidate two related arbitrations pursuant to
the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act.' Appellees opposed the
49. For other cases in the Second Circuit allowing consolidation since Byrd, see
Edelman v. Marek, 1992 U.S. Dist. LExis 16313 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Clipper Gas v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Cable Belt Conveyors, Inc. v. Alumina
Partners of Jamaica, 669 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1461, cert. denied, 484
U.S. 855 (1987); Shoyo Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Shipmair, 1986 A.M.C. 2374 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
50. See infra note 61.
51. 855 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1977 (1989).
52. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 251, § 2A (Law. Co-op. 1992).
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consolidation on the grounds that, absent express consent, consolidation
was barred by section 4 of the FAA, which required courts to enforce
arbitration agreements as written, and the FAA preempted any
contradictory state statute.s0 The Keystone court found that the FAA did
not preempt all state law on arbitration, and because the FAA is silent on
the issue of consolidation, the Massachusetts statute did not directly
conflict with the FAA's provisions' The court reasoned that when a
contract is silent on the issue of consolidation a court ordering
consolidation would not be contradicting the terms of the contract,
especially when state law allows for consolidated arbitrationss Finally,
the Keystone court determined that "the Massachusetts arbitration
consolidation provision, as appellants seek to enforce it, does not in any
way limit the 'broad principle of enforceability' of private agreements to
arbitrate."" The statute seeks only to make the arbitration process more
efficient.
The dissent in Keystone argued that consolidation was
inappropriate because the FAA and Supreme Court precedent mandated
that agreements to arbitrate be strictly enforced. The dissent asserted that
even if the consolidated arbitration would be more economical or efficient,
it was not what the parties agreed to, undertake. A court ordering
consolidation would be altering the parties' original agreement.'
State statutes providing for consolidated arbitrations are not
common.ss  Keystone demonstrates that there are some concerns about
statutes which may conflict with the FAA. California has adopted a
consolidation statute placing conditions on consolidation of arbitrations.
Generally, under the California statute, if there is a common issue of law
or fact arising out of the same transaction that would create the possibility
of conflicting results if the disputes were not consolidated, a judge can
order consolidation. 9 Like its Massachusetts counterpart, there is some
53. Keystone, 855 F.2d at 3.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 6-7.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id. at 8 (Selya, J., dissenting).
58. There are four states (California, Florida, Georgia, and Massachusetts) that allow for
consolidated arbitration as a matter of state law. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West
1982); FLA. STAT. § 684.12 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-6(e) (Michie 1991); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 251 § 2A (Law. Co-op. 1992). See generally State Court's Power to
Consolidate Arbitration Proceedings, 64 A.L.R. 3d 528 (1975).
59. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1991).
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dispute about this statute conflicting with the FAA.' Clearly though, the
reaction of states to consolidated arbitrations is permissive.6'
The states' attempts to solve the consolidation conflict have met
with some resistance. States are not allowed to regulate arbitration in ways
inconsistent with the FAA.' However, where the FAA is silent, the
state's power to supplement the "Act on matters collateral to the
agreement to arbitrate" may be broader. 63  In any event, attempts by
state legislatures to supplement the FAA may not completely succeed
where the states attempt to expand arbitration in ways inconsistent with
the goals of the FAA."
V. ANALYSIS: THE FUTURE OF COURT ORDERED CONSOLIDATION
Compelling consolidated arbitrations where a contract has not
provided for consolidation is clearly problematic. Courts in the Second
Circuit and some commentators argue that support for consolidation exists
in Rule 81(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows
courts to apply the FRCP when the FAA is silent on procedural issues of
arbitration.' Other courts and commentators reject FRCP 81(a)(3) in
favor of enforcing arbitration agreements as written." Nevertheless,
while the applicability of FRCP 81(a)(3) to consolidation questions remains
unclear,67 the future of court-ordered consolidation may have already
60. See Elizabeth P. Allor, Note, Keating v. Superior Court: Opressive [sic] Arbitration
Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1244-46 (1983).
61. Decisions approving of consolidation of arbitration under state law include: Garden
Grove Community Church v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19-20
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 558 P.2d 517, 523-24 (Nev.
1976); County of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelak, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 72, 74-75 (N.Y. 1977).
62. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984).
63. New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5 (1st. Cir.
1988).
64. See discussion of Judge Selya in Keystone. "[Sluperimposing Massachusetts' pro-
consolidation policy on the expressed wishes of the contracting parties unduly exalts state law
and, in the process, subverts the concept of 'creat[ing] a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.'" Id. at
10 (Selya, J., dissenting).
65. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Chastain, supra note 3, where the author suggests that the Supreme
Court's opinion in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), seems to
indicate that the decision to consolidate, while procedural in nature, should be left to the
arbitrator and not the courts if the parties have already obligated themselves to arbitration.
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been decided by the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd.
Those who favor court-ordered consolidation will eventually be
forced to justify consolidation in the context of the broad and sweeping
language of Byrd. The Byrd court, in mandating the strict enforcement of
arbitration agreements, took away a district court's discretion in enforcing
arbitration agreements.' This absence of discretion indicates that district
courts who have relied on their "discretion" in determining whether to
order consolidation, may have to rethink their positions. Without
discretionary power to interpret contracts, a district court's power to
consolidate is suspect. 9 The solution to the consolidation problem may
ultimately lie with Congress and state legislatures. Recent United States
Supreme Court decisions suggest the Court is unwilling to impose
obligations on parties to an arbitration agreement when those parties have
not specifically contracted for the obligation.7" Legislative action
granting courts the power to consolidate arbitrations would eliminate the
requirement that a contract must specifically provide for consolidation
before it could be ordered. While some have claimed that the FAA
preempts state regulation of consolidated arbitration, those arguments have
not been persuasive in the federal courts.7' Most courts and
commentators agree that consolidating arbitrations is desirable in many
instances. However, courts cannot exercise the power to consolidate if
they have not been granted that power by the legislature.
VI. CONCLUSION
An agreement to arbitrate is a contractual obligation. When
consolidation is not mentioned as part of an agreement to arbitrate, parties
have not bound themselves contractually to consolidation. Courts charged
with enforcing arbitration agreements are limited by the FAA and, in some
instances, by state statutes which supplement the FAA. Although
68. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
69. Proponents of court-ordered consolidation have also argued that consolidation has
become so common in commercial disputes that parties must impliedly consent to
consolidation when they enter agreements to arbitrate. This argument ignores the contractual
nature of arbitration agreements and is best answered by Judge Edelstein in Ore and
Chemical Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), when he stated
"if consolidated arbitration is so common and expected .... then the industry's participants
should make consolidation provisions standard in their arbitration clauses." Id. at 1513 n.4.
70. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
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equitable considerations may suggest that consolidation is appropriate
under some circumstances, courts do not possess the discretionary power
to alter arbitration agreements that contain no consolidation provisions.
Unless legislative action specifically empowers courts with the ability to
consolidate arbitrations, courts must continue to reject consolidation as an
option when consolidation provisions are not contained in an arbitration
agreement.
John P. Ware
